US returns to 'hard power' talk on Iran

Troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan and Obama's declining popularity may not be sufficient to prevent an American attack

• By Marwan Al Kabalan, Special to Gulf News
• Published: 00:00 August 6, 2010

• Te US must be absolutely serious about stopping Iran from becoming a hegemon power in the Gulf region notwithstanding the many difficulties it faces at home and abroad.
• Image Credit: Ador bustamante/Gulf News

After eighteen months of what many have described as pacifist and idealist foreign policy, the Obama administration seems to have returned to the "hard power" talk approach of the previous administration.

Last Sunday, and for the first time under his presidency, Barack Obama has allowed his top military commander to talk about the very possibility of attacking Iran.

In a televised interview, which captured the world's attention, the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Admiral Mike Mullen told Meet the Press on NBC that his administration "has a plan to attack Iran".

Mullen, who has always opposed a military strike on Iran on the assumption that such a strike would have serious consequences across the Middle East, thinks now that "the risk of Iran's developing a nuclear weapon is unacceptable".

In fact, the remarks by the US chairman of the JCS on Iran have taken many off guard. This sort of rhetoric has all but disappeared from the US official speech since the Bush administration left office in January 2009. The Obama administration has instead been talking about dialogue and diplomatic means to solve the Iranian nuclear problem. In recent months, however, Washington started to take tougher stands on Iran. It rejected the Tehran Declaration, resulting from the Turkish-Brazilian mediation to avoid another round of sanctions against Iran by the UN Security Council.

The US not only obtained another resolution from the Security Council that condemns Iran's nuclear activities but imposed harsh unilateral sanctions on Tehran too. It shows that the Obama administration is no less serious than its predecessor to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. There is, in fact, ample evidence to suggest that the US will, under no circumstances, accept a nuclear Iran in the vitally important region of the Gulf.

The US troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan, the declining popularity of Obama at home and the difficulties facing the US strategy in other parts of the region do not seem sufficient to prevent the US from launching a massive military attack to stop Iran from going nuclear. The stakes are, hence, high for the Obama administration and allowing Iran to possess nuclear weapons will at the very least mean the end of the six-decade US national security strategy in the Middle East.

Since the end of the Second World War, US administrations, Democrats and Republicans alike, have been mainly seeking to prevent any power, regional or global, from controlling the oil-rich region of the Gulf. This fear was justified on the grounds that controlling massive oil supplies by unfriendly states would allow them to blackmail the West. The US spent large part of its resources during the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union and prevent it from reaching the strategically important oil resources of the Gulf region.

The importance of oil supplies for the US was highlighted by the Carter Doctrine, which came as a response to both the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

"Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Arabian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force," President Jimmy Carter stated.

During the Iran-Iraq war the US strategy was to prevent any party from gaining control in the Gulf region. It hence supported Iran and Iraq at different times. Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to Carter admitted in his memoirs that his administration supplied Iran with arms and other sort of logistic assistance in the early days of the Iran-Iraq war.

The Reagan administration, which succeeded Carter's, was divided over which side the US should support: Islamist anti-communist Iran or secularist pro-Soviet Iraq. Some US officials advocated the argument that Khomeini's Iran, which at the time moved hastily to garner support in the Islamic world against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, better served US strategy in the region.

However, the disclosure of the Iran-Contra affair put an end to this argument and prevented further cooperation with the Islamic regime. Washington was forced to distance itself from Tehran and tilt largely towards Iraq.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US decided to intervene militarily to prevent Saddam Hussain from possessing too much oil to "impose his will on the West". The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was partly driven by the desire to secure adequate oil supplies and thwart China's oil ambitions.

All this suggests that the US must be absolutely serious about stopping Iran from becoming a hegemon power in the Gulf region notwithstanding the many difficulties it faces at home and abroad. The Iranian leadership does realise this and may hence decide to approach the Americans and get them to talk about what concerns them.